A Nobel-winning opposition inside the country, a president-elect in exile, and a sitting government backed by China and Russia: Venezuela is living two presidencies at once.
3 Narratives News | November 1, 2025
On July 28, 2024, Venezuelans cast ballots in an election whose full polling-station tallies were never published. Since then, two parallel realities have competed for legitimacy. One says diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia won and was driven into exile, with opposition leader and 2025 Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado sustaining the claim from inside Venezuela. The other says President Nicolás Maduro lawfully secured another six-year term and that foreign governments, especially the United States and its allies in the region, are plotting to force him out. Argentina’s president, Javier Milei, and El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele, have now joined the opposition chorus, while China and Russia are telling Washington, “hands off.” This is no longer a purely Venezuelan dispute. It is a question of who gets to certify power in Latin America.
Context: What actually happened?
On July 28 2024 the electoral body, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE), announced that Nicolás Maduro won with approximately 51.2 % of the vote, while González claimed around 44.2 % according to the official figure. :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5} The opposition rejected those numbers, saying it had collected tally-sheets from about 80-84 % of polling stations and that those sheets indicated González had won by a large margin. :contentReference[oaicite:6]{index=6} Across Latin America, responses were split. Many governments refused to recognise Maduro’s victory or inauguration, citing the absence of full polling-station results. Others––notably Cuba and Nicaragua––congratulated him unreservedly. :contentReference[oaicite:7]{index=7}
In October 2025 the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to María Corina Machado “for her struggle to achieve a just and peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy.” :contentReference[oaicite:8]{index=8} The opposition immediately interpreted the award as global validation of its side of the contest. At the same time Maduro dispatched envoys and letters to Russia, China and Iran requesting air-defence systems, aircraft repairs and radar upgrades, framing U.S. naval deployments in the Caribbean as a direct threat. China, which had congratulated Maduro after the election, repeated its familiar mantra that Venezuela’s internal affairs are for Venezuelans alone. :contentReference[oaicite:9]{index=9}
Behind these diplomatic flashpoints lies a regional subplot: El Salvador’s president Nayib Bukele publicly proposed a prisoner-swap deal—252 Venezuelans held in his CECOT mega-prison, many deported from the U.S., for an equal number of Venezuelan political detainees held by the regime. Caracas rejected the plan as “cynical.” The episode kept Venezuela’s human-rights question in the headlines.
Narrative 1 — “Venezuela already chose Machado and González, the world just needs to enforce it.”
From the opposition’s perspective the fundamental fact is non-negotiable: the 2024 vote ended Maduro’s rule. They argue that the tally-sheets they collected represent a legitimate and verifiable result, and that the CNE’s failure to publish complete counts proves the regime is buying time. Under that logic, Edmundo González Urrutia is the rightful, if exiled, president.
María Corina Machado is the face of that movement inside Venezuela. Banned from candidacy, harassed, forced on the run, she remained in the country precisely to anchor the transition claim. Her Nobel Prize amplified the message: her recent interviews suggesting that credible U.S. deterrence could open the door were part of a strategy to raise the political cost of ignoring the vote.
International amplification matters. Argentina’s president, Javier Milei, elected December 2023, has repeatedly labelled Maduro a “narco-dictator” and met González in Buenos Aires in early 2025. The president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, while less vocal on the election itself, has publicly labelled Venezuelan detainees “political prisoners” and linked migration flows to the regime’s crisis. In this frame, China and Russia offer cover, not veto: the opposition believes that once Washington, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Bogotá and other capitals act together, the Venezuelan military will hedge, business elites will re-engage and transition will begin. In short: the transition has already occurred in electoral and diplomatic terms; what remains is territorial enforcement.
Narrative 2 — “Maduro is the one keeping the Caribbean from blowing up.”
From the vantage of Miraflores Palace the story is different. Nicolás Maduro says Venezuela held elections, invited observers and certified a result, and everything that followed — the Milei-González meetings, Bukele’s prisoner gambit, U.S. warships in the Caribbean, the Nobel awarded to an opposition leader — is part of a coordinated regime-change operation aimed at removing an anti-U.S. government.
This is where China and Russia step in. In late October 2025 reports out of Washington and Moscow said Maduro had formally asked Russia to strengthen air-defences, repair Russian-made aircraft, and asked China to accelerate radar deliveries — casting U.S. deployments as a threat to both Venezuela and its “strategic partners.” China responded with its usual refrain: no external interference. Russia publicly condemned U.S. use of force in the region. That gives Maduro visible backing.
At the same time, and this is the subtle piece: Maduro has kept a lane open to Washington. Venezuelan officials have discussed potential oil access, indicated willingness to accept return of deported Venezuelans, and — according to some U.S. media — floated broader energy deals to reduce the incentive for direct intervention. In this narrative, María Corina Machado is not a democrat-hero but the figurehead of a U.S. pressure campaign; Edmundo González is just another “self-proclaimed” leader in a long line; Milei and Bukele are ideological showmen. And above all: Maduro stands, he says, because he is the actor who prevents crisis. If he stays, oil flows continue, migration is managed, and no proxy war explodes in the Caribbean.
Narrative 3 — The silent, untelevised Venezuela between fleets and prisons
Between these two grand narratives lies the lived reality of millions of Venezuelans. On the eastern coast, fisher-folk watch U.S. aircraft patrol overhead and face more inspections. Families whose relatives are in CECOT in El Salvador fear they remain bargaining chips. Civil servants who quietly leaked voting minutes in 2024 now worry whether whichever side prevails will punish them. None are on stage, but all are in flux.
Then there are the millions of migrants. More than 7 million Venezuelans are abroad as of late 2024 and early 2025, continuing to be told “change is near” every cycle. Each year in exile erodes trust — a Machado–González government, if it ever materialises, must convince not just of legitimacy but of deliverables. Finally, any transition that depends on U.S. naval pressure, China’s non-interference, Russia’s weapons and two media-savvy presidents (Milei and Bukele) has a built-in legitimacy question: was this change Venezuelan, or was it engineered?
Key Takeaways
- María Corina Machado’s 2025 Nobel Peace Prize re-energised the opposition’s claim that the 2024 election remains unresolved. :contentReference[oaicite:10]{index=10}
- Edmundo González Urrutia is recognised by the U.S., the European Parliament and several Latin governments as Venezuela’s president-elect, yet he remains outside the country. :contentReference[oaicite:11]{index=11}
- Nicolás Maduro retains control of state institutions, has requested Russian and Chinese military support, and continues negotiations with the U.S. to maintain oil and migration channels. :contentReference[oaicite:12]{index=12}
- China and Russia’s backing gives Maduro stability, while the opposition counts on regional diplomacy, sanction pressure and mobilisation. :contentReference[oaicite:13]{index=13}
- The Venezuelans most affected — migrants, detainees, informal economy workers, mid-level officials — have the least control over how this transition, or non-transition, will be decided.
Questions This Article Answers
- Who is the “president-in-hiding” mentioned in recent coverage? It is Edmundo González Urrutia, the opposition diplomat whom the U.S., the European Parliament and others recognise as the winner of Venezuela’s July 2024 vote, though he remains abroad. :contentReference[oaicite:14]{index=14}
- Why are China and Russia defending Nicolás Maduro now? Because they oppose U.S. military pressure in the Caribbean, view Venezuela as a strategic partner and restate the principle of non-interference in foreign states’ affairs. :contentReference[oaicite:15]{index=15}
- What roles are Javier Milei and Nayib Bukele playing in Venezuela’s crisis? Milei has given the Venezuelan opposition presidential-level recognition; Bukele has leveraged Venezuelan detainees and migrant flows to keep human-rights issues in the spotlight.
- Is Nicolás Maduro really trying to keep the peace with the U.S.? Yes. While denouncing U.S. force, he has insisted he can deliver oil access, manage migration and prevent destabilisation — all selling points for Washington.
- Could a Machado–González administration take office in Venezuela? Only if the military hedges, regional governments act together, and at least one of Venezuela’s major backers (China or Russia) accepts a transition. At present none of those conditions is fully met.
Related 3N stories: The President or the Cartel: Trump’s Shadow War in Venezuela, Nuclear Race: The Best Way for Peace?
External sources: Reuters – Americas, Al Jazeera – Venezuela, Washington Post – Venezuela seeks Russian help
